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The poor are not randomly distributed throughout the American 
metropolis. Within any metropolitan area, some political subdivisions . 
-usually but not always the "central city" -contain a greater than aver-· 
age concentration of residences of the poor, while other political sub-
divisions-usually but not always the "suburbs" -contain a lower than 
average concentration. This phenomenon, which we shall call income 
group clustering, is thought by inany observers to be highly undesir-
able for many reasons. It is seen as a symptom of social disorder, as an 
indication that constitutional norms are being violated, and as an 
obstacle to the realization of widely held public policy goals.1 Con-
sequently, litigation and legislative efforts have been mounted to re-
duce the degree of income group clustering.2 A major target of the ef-
fort has been suburban land use controls, alleged to be a cause of 
clustering. The attack has led to judicial consideration of the equal 
protection issues involved,3 and has inspired several policy proposals 
currently under debate.4 
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1. See, e.g., NATIO:SAL CoMMISSION oN URBAN 1'RonLE.\tS1 BUILDING TilE AMERICA!'~ Ctn', 
H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. (1968) [hereinafter referred to as DotrCL\S CoM:o.t. 
REPORT]; PRESIDENTS Co~m. ON URBAN HoUSING, A DECENT HOME (1968); Gold 8: D;l\·idoff, 
The Supply and Availability of Land for Housing for Low- and Moderate-Income Families, 
~ in 2 TECHNICAL STUDIES 287 {President's Committee on Urban Housing 1968); HEArul'iC 
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES Co~IMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUNE 14-17, 1971. 
2. For a general discussion of this subject sec Shields 8: Spector, Opening Up tlu: 
Suburbs: Notes on a Movement for Social Change, 2 YALE R.Ev. L. 8: Soc. AcnoN !:00 (1972). 
3. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 1117 (1971), rev'g, Valtierra \', Housing Au-
thority, 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10tlJ 
Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 
424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. 
Supp. 669 (W".D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d lOS (2d Cir. 19i0), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 
1010 (1971). In most of these cases-as is typical of cases attacking "exdusionaf}' zoning" 
in its many forms-claiins both of racial discrimination and of wealth discnmination 
are raised. 
4. For a discussion of some proposals see CIVIL Rlcuts HEAruNcs, supra note 1, 
at 828 (Testimony of David M. Trubek). 
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Until we know more about income group clustering, it is doubtful
that the legal issues will be resolved or effective policies shaped. Be-
cause much more effort has been devoted to attacking and defending
clustering than to understanding it, constitutional debate has been
murky, and the potential effects of proposed legislative measures are
unclear. This article attempts to fill the gap, by reporting and explain-
ing a statistical study of clustering which we recently conducted.
By surveying American metropolitan areas, the study produces sig-
nificant evidence that clustering is aggravated by the imposition of
public land use controls-such as zoning-in the suburbs. It also sug-
gests that such controls are not typically imposed for fiscal reasons,
i.e., to increase the taxable value of real property in the jurisdiction
and to exclude low income residents who would heavily burden the
jurisdiction's public services. Finally, the study finds that income group
clustering is greater the more heavily non-white are the low income
groups involved. These findings thus raise but do not resolve the ques-
tion whether clustering results to a degree from racially motivated
public controls. We stress that our conclusions are very tentative, and
subject to many qualifications. They are presented not to close inquiry
but to suggest the potential fruitfulness-and the limits-of ordinary
statistical methods in investigating the etiology of income group clus-
tering.
The First Section of the article identifies various factors which might
conceivably explain clustering, and notes briefly how the resolution of
several legal issues will depend in part on which factors are in fact
operative. The Second Section selects from among the possible ex-
planatory factors several which have especial relevance to constitutional
law and social policy and describes our attempt to quantify these factors
-i.e., to fashion operational "variables" which plausibly represent the
factors-so that the relative impact of each factor on clustering could
be measured by statistical analysis. In the Third Section, we present
and explain the results of our statistical analysis, and in the Fourth
Section, we draw conclusions from these results.
I. Clustering: The Two Questions
A. What Causes Clustering?
Public land use controls may increase the degree of income group
clustering in a straightforward manner. Controls-zoning, subdivision
regulations, building codes, and the like-raise the cost to a family of
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living in the controlled jurisdiction: the controls require a family to
buy or rent more or better land or dwelling space than it might need,5
and they simultaneously reduce the total supply of residences in the
community, thus creating an artificial shortage of residences, with a
resultant rise in rents or sales prices. The poor are excluded because
they cannot afford to move in.6
But income group clustering might occur even if suburbs were not
surrounded by an "invisible wall" of public controls. Private restrictive
covenants, running with the land, can control land uses almost as effec-
tively as public controls and may thus constitute an invisible wall of
their own. Further, some suburban land owners may individually sell
or rent on a racially discriminatory basis, even at a sacrifice to their
pecuniary profits: racial discrimination will result in income cluster-
ing because non-whites have on the average lower personal income than
whites. Finally, some clustering--perhaps a great deal-might occur
even if the real estate market were unconstrained by public controls
and restrictive covenants and untainted by racial discrimination. The
poor may be unable to afford to live in portions of the metropolis
which-even in the absence of zoning and covenants-are universally
thought desirable and in which, as a consequence of high buyer and
renter demand, rents and sales prices are very high. (It is also possible,
of course, that the poor wish to live among other poor.)
No social or legal policy can eliminate or substantially reduce clus-
tering without addressing its causes. For policy formation, it is thus
crucial to discover to what extent the observed degree of clustering in
the United States results from, respectively, public land use controls,
private covenants, racial discrimination by individual lessors and sell-
ers, and the workings of an unconstrained market in which real proper-
ties are of various qualities and buyers have varying tastes and incomes.
5. A recent example of the cost-increasing type of requirements through which towns
attempt to exclude poorer potential residents is found in Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro,
116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1972). The zoning ordinance required, among other
things, that each apartment have central air conditioning and an automatic garbage
disposal, that each building have a master TV antenna, that there be an automatic
laundry washer and dryer provided for every eight bedrooms, that there be eight
square feet of swimming pool or tennis court area for every 100 square feet of lihing
space, and that there be two off-street parking places for each unit, despite the fact
that there could be an average of only 1.35 bedrooms per unit.
6. See DOuGLAS Comm. REPORT, supra note 1, at 214; .Aoi, Goldberg & White, Racial
and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1 U. Torxno L REv.
65, 74-80 (1969); Bowe, Regional Planning Versus Decentralized Land.Use Controls-Zoning
for the Megalopolis, 18 DEPAuL L. Rav. 144, 155 (1958); Davidoff & Gold, Exclusionary
Zoning, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc. Acnox 56, 60 (1971); Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the
Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SyAcusE L. Rav. 509 (1971).
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B. What Motivates Imposition of Public Controls?
Suppose one had identified and measured the relative weight of
the several possible causes of clustering and discovered that public
controls were prominent among them. There would remain a second
empirical question relevant to the legal and social policy issues raised
by income group clustering: What motivated public officials to impose
these controls? An answer is important because the constitutionality of
public controls may depend on the reasons animating their imposition;
and because legal and social policies addressed to issues other than clus-
tering may incidentally affect clustering if they strike at the factors
which lead local authorities to impose land use controls.
Exclusionary zoning-constitutional attacks: A number of constitu-
tional challenges have been mounted to the use of public land use con-
trols by suburban and other jurisdictions, 7 alleging that these controls
prevent minority groups and the poor from residing in suburbs and
thus discriminate against them in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. These challenges present difficult doctrinal issues on which the
law is both unclear and in substantial flux.8 Here we aim only to indi-
cate how the empirical issue of causation may affect the doctrinal de-
bate.
The Equal Protection challenge rests on the assumption that state
action is denying a constitutionally-protected right. The Equal Pro-
tection challengers assert that some lower income and minority groups
would reside in jurisdictions imposing controls if the controls were
lifted-contending that controls are at least one effective cause of clus-
tering.
The challengers also allege, however, that controls are imposed for
constitutionally proscribed motives. The suits thus move beyond the
causes of clustering to delve into the causes of controls. To discover
or measure what considerations animate the actions of public officials
is, of course, a staggeringly complex task. "Motive" is important, how-
ever, because the constitutional defect of public controls must be
demonstrated, if at all, through an indirect analysis. Public controls
which expressly exclude racial groups or raise the cost of housing
services beyond the means of expressly identified racial minorities are
undoubtedly unconstitutional.0 Moreover, it is at least arguable that
7. See cases cited note 3 supra.
8. For a discussion of doctrinal problems, see Note, The Equal Protection Clause
and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALF L.J. 61 (1971).
9. Zoning lines drawn on racial grounds were outlawed by Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Dailey v. City
of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). Although no court has considered the Issue
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explicit exclusion of low income groups is constitutionally suspect.10
But public ordinances do not admit their purposes so baldly, and pub-
lic officials typically justify the imposition of controls by reference to
constitutionally neutral goals; e.g., protection of health; preservation
of property values; maintenance of an attractive physical environment;
reduction of pressure on local services, and attraction of land uses
which provide a favorable ratio of property tax generated to public
services required."
To prevail, challengers of current controls probably must demon-
strate that constitutionally permissible motives did not in fact animate
imposition of the controls in question. This is a difficult burden:
Whether the challenge is mounted on Due Process or Equal Protection
grounds, the courts tend to presume the legitimacy of the legislation
or ordinance creating the controls and to accept at face value the neu-
tral motives asserted by challenged officials. 12 Further, challengers must
probably do more than throw the asserted motives into serious ques-
tion. They may also have to show at least that among the actual motives
of the enacting jurisdiction were ones that are constitutionally im-
permissible.13
squarely, it would seem to follow that economic barriers explicitly and specifically
created to exclude racial groups would be found to create an invidious classification.
Of course, the "fit" between the group excluded and a racial minority would havc
to be close. Cf. Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 8.
10. See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); But cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
11. For a discussion of this "fiscal motive," see Josephs v. Town Bd. of Clarkstown.
24 Misc. 2d 366, 368-69, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Becker, The Police Power
and Minimum Lot Zoning, 1969. WASH. U.L.Q. 263, 282-86, Stuart & Teska, Who Pays
for What: A Cost-Revenue Analysis of Suburban Land Use Alternatives, UPnN LAD,
March, 1971, at 3-16.
12. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
13. The doctrinal issues are complex. There arc some indications that the courts will
invalidate a law neutral on its face if it can be shown to be motivated by racial animus.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). But there are contrary indications in recent
cases. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971). The confusion and difficulty may stem more from the problem of proving motile
than from any feeling that racially-motivated but formally neutral laws should stand.
In most cases "motive" is difficult to identify: The truly biased legislator or adminis-
trator rarely makes his views public. Some cases have suggested that a neutral law
placing a heavier burden on racial minority groups than on the populace generally should
be presumed to have been motivated by racial animus and thus should fall before the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Nonlk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 (2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). But recent Supreme Court opinions have cast considerable
doubt on this principle. See Jefferson v. Hackney. supra; James v. Valtierra 4021. U.S.
137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969). For discussion of doctrinal issues,
see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legis.
lative Motive, 1971 Tim Supr.tEm CouRT REVIEW 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
While the doctrine on racial motive and effect is unclear, the law in the area of
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The list of impermissible motives is not long. It almost surely in.
cludes racial motivation. Whether a motive to exclude low income
groups generally is constitutionally impermissible is less certain. We
suggested above that an ordinance might well fall if it expressly pro-
hibited or expressly made especially costly the inmigration of low in-
come groups. But it is an open question whether an ordinance which,
on its face, merely requires large lot sizes or which prohibits multi-
family structures becomes invalid if the motive for its passage is shown
to be the exclusion of low income groups.
The question is important because many observers believe that such
ordinances are typically enacted for fiscal reasons: to exclude both new
low income housing, which adds relatively little to the jurisdiction's
property tax base, and the low income inhabitants of such housing,
who impose high demands on local public services, especially educa-
tion.14 This "fiscal motive" looms large, at least as a hypothesis, because
local governments in the United States finance themselves heavily
through the local property tax and because these governments are fre-
quently charged with providing services, such as welfare and education,
of which the poor make relatively heavy use.' 5
economic exclusion is even more murky. Opponents of exclusionary zoning have reposed
great hopes in the development of a doctrine of "substantive equal protection" and In
the expansion of this doctrine to cover land-use controls whose intent or effects were
to disadvantage the poor. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and
Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971). These efforts received some encourage-
ment in the lower federal courts; see, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Or-
ganization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). But to date the Supreme
Court has refused to take this doctrinal step. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143(1971) (dissent of Marshall, J.). Since the court has not yet specifically defined any
substantive "right to housing" or .access to housing" under the Fourteenth Amendment,
judges have given little attention to the constitutional significance, if any, of the ex-
istence of an economically segregating motive or effect behind land.use controls and
other public measures. Commentators, however, have argued that race and class motives
underlie these measures. For critical discussion of the "fiscal motive" theory and stg-
gestions that racial and class motives lie behind land-use controls, see Babcock &
Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 10-10, 1068-72
(1963); Davidoff & Davidoff, supra note 6.
14. On fiscal motive see D. NErzER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEM15: DIAGNOSEs AND
PRESCRIPTIONS 192 (1970); IV. ISARD & R. COUGHLIN, MUNICIPAL COSTS AND REVENUES (1957);
Margolis, On Municipal Land Policy for Fiscal Gains, 9 NAT. TAx J. 247 (1956). See also
the many studies by which towns determine whether to disallow various types of land
use based on cost-benefit analyses, e.g., Stuart & Teska, supra note 11; BOARD OF EDUC.,
SCHOOL DIST. 68, SKOKIE, ILLINOIS, A STUDY OF THE EFFECT or ZONING ON PUPIL EN-
ROLLMENT AND FINANCIAL SUP'PORT OF AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL; Del Guidice, Cost -Reeenue
Implications of High-Rise Apartments, URBAN LAND, February, 1963, at 3; and the many
studies cited in R. MACE, MUNICIPAL COST-REVENUE RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES (1961).
15. On "exclusionary" practices, see DOUGLAS COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 199,
212, 214; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 14243 (1968); Gold &
Davidoff, supra note 1, at 59. In 1966-67, forty-three percent of local government reve-
nues were derived from the property tax. By comparison, all other local taxes con-
tributed only 6.8% of local revenues. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 4 CENSUS OF GOVERIN-
MENTS, 1967, No. 5: COMENDIUM OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES, Table 4 (1969).
Both municipal revenues and municipal costs are substantially affected by the type
488
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If a bare motive to exclude low income groups is constitutionally
impermissible, the "fiscal motive" is at least suspect. Those who pro-
fess it are admitting that they intend to exclude the poor and are
merely suggesting that their intent is excusable because their ultimate
goal, i.e., fiscal benefits for themselves, is "neutral." This is somewhat
different from the reasoning which validates public controls imposed
for motives such as public health, safety and aesthetics. In these cases,
the defendant disavows any intention to exclude the poor, and claims
that the de facto exclusion of the poor is merely an unfortunate inci-
dent of pursuing an unrelated and permissible goal.
At any rate, the constitutional issues surrounding "exclusionary"
zoning clearly depend in large part on tvo distinct factual questions:
(1) Do such public controls appreciably contribute to income group
clustering (and thus inevitably to racial clustering)? (2) Is the imposi-
tion of such controls animated by racial motives, fiscal motives, a non-
fiscal motive to exclude the poor, or by clearly permissible "neutral"
motives? The answers to these questions will obviously vary both be-
tiveen metropolitan areas and within each area over time. Statistical
studies like ours, which attempt to illuminate the issues of causation
and motivation for the nation as a whole at a particular point in time,
cannot themselves settle the empirical questions that arise in specific
law suits concerned with specific controls in specific suburbs.
By showing national tendencies, however, such general statistical
studies, if sufficiently refined, can indicate what sorts of rebuttable
presumptions the courts ought to entertain. If, for instance, it were
shown that public controls and clustering were strongly correlated
across the nation, a court might be well advised to impose on the de-
fending local government the burden of proving that, in the specific
case at hand, public controls were not in fact the crucial barrier to an
inmigration of poor families. Similarly, if a particular motive were
shown to animate (or not to animate) controls in many instances na-
tionally, the burden of proof should, arguably, be imposed on the
of land use allowed in the town. Certain uses, such as industry, generate high revenues
and require small increases in municipal budgets. Such uses are considered to be good
"tax-ratables." Other uses generate low amounts of taxes in relationship to the demands
they create for additional services. See Schmandt, Municipal Control of Urban Ewcpan-
sion, 29 FoRD. L. Rlv. 637, 651 (1961); Barnes & Raymond, The Fiscal Approach to Land
Use Planning, 21 J. AM. INst. PLANNERS 71 (1955); G. EssER, ARe NEv REsWrrTLAL
AREAS A Tax LIABILrrY? (1956); Williams & Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas
Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827, 828-29; Stuart
& Teska, supra note 11; Williams, The Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25 RrGens
L. REv. 80, 82-85 (1970). According to one study, the effect of lot size on minimum
housing cost has been greatly overemphasized. Uus.p LAND INsTrrtur, Tite EFFecrs OF
LARGE LOT SIZE ON REsmENTIAL DEvE.OPMET (Technical Bull. 32 1958).
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party claiming that that motive was absent (present) in the particular
case at bar.
Other Attacks on Clustering and Related Measures: Recent court
decisions such as Serrano'6 and Rodrigueza7 have challenged the system
of financing education through the real property tax.18 If the fiscal
motive theory is correct, these decisions may eliminate exclusionary
land use controls by eliminating the animating reasons for their enact-
ment. If, however, the fiscal motive theory is not a valid explanation
for exclusionary practices, it would be rash to expect that educational
finance reform will, like Joshua's trumpet, bring down the invisible
wall.
Similarly, data on the causes of clustering and the motives for con-
trols are needed to assess proposed statutory remedies for clustering.
Any efforts, for example, to structure statutes that might curb the
effects of exclusionary zoning must take into account the underlying
forces that have led to them.' 9 Also, the role of fair housing legislation
and other civil rights measures in limiting clustering cannot be pre-
dicted until we know whether minority racial groups are frozen out of
white suburbs by private discrimination or by "neutral" land use con-
trols, imposed by restrictive covenants or by local governments.
II. Definitions of Variables and Methods of Study
A. The Approach
Our study, based primarily on census data, measures variations in
the degree of income group clustering among America's major metro-
politan areas and examines whether these variations are correlated with
inter-area variations in factors which we associate, respectively, with
the racial motive and the fiscal motive for imposing public land use
controls. About this approach, three preliminary comments are neces-
sary.
First, our study presents only a "snapshot" of the United States at a
particular point in time. That is, we have been concerned only with
differences in clustering between different metropolitan areas, rather
16. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
17. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist. (W.D . lex. 1972), prob. furls.
noted, 406 U.S. 966 (1972).
18. See also Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971). Contra Spano v. Bd. of Educ. of Lakeland
Central School Dist. No. 1, 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
19. See CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS, supra note 1, at 828 (testimony of David M. Trubek).
Vol. 82: 483, 1973
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than with variations in the degree of clustering which occur within
each area over time. Trends over time are obviously important for
policy analysis, but reliable census data for metropolitan areas are avail-
able only decennially, and only the two most recent censuses presented
data in a sufficiently detailed manner for our purposes.
Second, our study-like any statistical study-deals only with corre-
lations, i.e., associations, between variables. The fact that changes
in variable A are highly correlated with changes in variable B does
not itself prove that the changes in B are causing the changes in A.
The reverse might equally be the case, or it might be that changes
in some undetected variable, C, are causing the observed changes
in both A and B. Suppose, for instance, that in comparing one city
with another we find that, in the latter, people both work longer
hours and have shorter life-spans. This bare correlation between work
hours and life-span is consistent with three divergent hypotheses:
that long hours shorten life, that people who know their lives will be
short choose to work long hours, and that some third factor, e.g., pov-
erty, causes both long work hours and a short life-span. Further statisti-
cal study might permit us to narrow the possibilities, but at some point
we would probably have to invoke experience and common sense to
interpret the raw correlations. The correlations we establish in our
study often permit of several hypotheses. At times a rough standard of
plausibility must be invoked to decide between hypotheses; at other
times, we simply leave the question open for further investigation.
Third, our study unfortunately mixes together the two distinct ques-
tions which, in the previous section, we noted as being important for
purposes of policy: (1) To what extent is clustering caused by public
land use controls, rather than other factors-such as restrictive cove-
nants, the racial attitudes of individual sellers and renters, or free mar-
ket bidding for locations made desirable by factors other than land-
use controls? (2) What motivates local officials to impose public land-
use controls? An ideal statistical study would proceed in two steps.
First, it would measure the correlation between inter-area variations
in income group clustering, on the one hand, and inter-area variations
in public controls on the other hand. Next, it would measure the cor-
relation between inter-area variations in controls and inter-area varia-
tions in factors associated with the possible motives for imposing con-
trols. But such an approach would require, at both stages, quantifica-
tion and measurement of the extent to which "controls" are imposed
in metropolitan areas. We found this an impossible task: controls take
myriad forms, from lot size zoning to building codes, and there is no
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objective method by which all these devices can be compared, meas-
ured, and ranked along a single quantitative scale. Even if such an ob-
jective method were found-which we think unlikely-the costs in data
gathering would be enormous.
Therefore, our approach represents a compromise. Rather than pro-
ceeding in two steps, our study probes directly the relationship be-
tween various "motives" and clustering. Findings about this relation-
ship require cautious interpretation: some of the factors which we
associate with the fiscal and racial motives may themselves operate
through the private real estate market to aggravate clustering. Thus, if
we find that a particular "motive"-factor correlates with clustering, it
need not follow that that "motive" in fact animated public officials to
impose controls which then caused the observed degree of clustering.
Rather, we may merely have isolated a factor which influenced the
preferences of buyers toward clustering or which encouraged sellers
and renters to discriminate individually or to execute restrictive cove-
nants regarding land use. Despite all these qualifications, however, our
study does provide some indication that public controls influence the
degree of clustering and some information about the motives which
influence imposition of public controls. Further discussion of our re-
sults, however, must await a fuller description of the study itself.
B. The Variables
Clustering (Y): The Dependent Variable
Our first task was to develop a way to measure income group clus-
tering. We decided to look at the patterns of where poor people actu-
ally live and to contrast these patterns with a hypothesized "norm" of
dispersion. The norm we selected was that the poor people as a percent
of municipal population be the same for every town in a metropolitan
region. We define the deviation between this arbitrary norm and actual
patterns as the degree of "clustering" present.
It was, of course, necessary to define a standard of poverty. Food,
housing, and clothing are the major items purchased by the poor. Due
to differences in climate and geography, the costs of these items differ
in various urban areas. Rather than use the same absolute monetary
definition for all metropolitan areas, we defined poverty in relative
terms for each metropolitan area. Consider the analysis for 1960. For
each metropolitan area, we defined as poor any family which had less
than the median family income in 1959, rounded to the nearest one
thousand dollars. Thus our "poverty" standard is considerably higher
492
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than the $3,000 usually used in government publications.20 For exam-
ple, in 1959 the median family income in the New York metropolitan
area was $6,696; we round this to $7,000 and consider as poor all fami-
lies with a 1959 income below $7,000. By this definition, in the New
York metropolitan area 54 percent of the families were poor in 1959.
We then computed the proportion of poor families in each town in
the New York metropolitan area; this ranged, in 1959, from 6.7 per-
cent in East Hills to 79.5 percent in Mastic Shirley.
We next sought to summarize the information about residential pat-
terns in each metropolitan area into a single number, i.e., a clustering
index, so that we could compare clustering between metropolitan areas.
To appreciate the complexity of this task, consider two hypotheti-
cal metropolitan areas, A and B, each having 100,000 persons:
metropolitan area A metropolitan area B
total pooras total pooras
popula- percent of popula- percent of
tion poor total tion poor total
town 1 40,000 10,000 25 8,500 8M500 22.1
town 2 10,000 0 0 11,500 1,500 18.0
town 3 50,000 40,000 80 50,000 40.000 80
100,000 50,000 50 100,000 50,000 50
In each area town 3, the central city, has half the metropolitan popu-
lation and has 80 percent of the poor, and each area has two suburbs,
towns 1 and 2. Which metropolitan area deviates more from our norm
of an equal proportion of poor in each town? From the point of view
of the mayor of the central city (town 3), both areas represent an equal
degree of clustering, since in both hypothetical cases the central city
has 80 percent of the poor. A poor person might consider area B to be
less "clustered," since the poor there can live in either of two suburbs,
as compared to only one suburb in area A. On the other hand, town 1
in area A is nearer the norm of fifty percent poor than town 1 in area
B (and town 2 is further away from the norm in area A than in area
B). In constructing an index, what weights should be used to "average"
the clustering of town 1 and the clustering of town 2?21
20. We chose median income to define the "poor" so as to capture exclusionary
effects aimed at buyers and renters of unsubsidized "cheap" housing. We did not wish
to investigate only the exclusion of low income subsidized housing projects.
21. We could have weighted the clustering of each town by its residential land area,
so that towns with a large amount of residential land count for more than small towns.
We rejected this scheme because (1) we could not obtain data on the amount of land
considered by local observers to be residential in each town in each metropolitan area
and (2) the amount of residential land in a town depends on the amount of money
available for converting land to residential uses; one could consider a body of water
as "residential land," since homes can be built over water.
We also rejected weighting each town by the number of its poor inhabitants, since a
town with very exclusionary zoning would have no poor and so receive a ieight of
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Any set of weights is somewhat arbitrary. We decided to weight the
deviation of the poor in each town from the percentage of the poor in
the entire metropolitan population by the relative population of the
town, i.e., its share of the total metropolitan population. If all the
towns in an area met our norm, the index for the area would be zero.





















































































































































































zero. Nor did we want to give each town in a metropolitan area an equal weight since
the number of towns in a metropolitan area depends heavily on state annexation laws
and historical factors and ranges, in our sample, in 1960 from nine in Akron to 300
in New York.
22. Let p, be the proportion of the population in town i that is poor and let w,
be the proportion of the metropolitan population living in town i. Let p be the pro.
portion of poor families in the entire metropolitan population. Then the clustering
index for a metropolitan area with n towns is
n
w, (p - pl)2i=1
Vol. 82: 483, 1973
HeinOnline  -- 82 Yale L.J. 494 1972-1973
Measuring the Invisible Wall
show in columns 5 and 6 of Table 123 its value for each metropolitan
area in our sample for 1960 and 1970.24
A comparison of columns 5 and 6 in Table I reveals that the ranking
of areas by the clustering of their poor families is similar in both 1959
and 1969.25 In only four of the thirty metropolitan areas-Sacramento,
San Diego, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia-were the poor less concen-
trated in 1970 than in 1960.206
Our sample consists of the two Standard Consolidated Areas-New
York27 and Chicago-and twenty-eight Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (SMSA's). -s The twenty-eight SMSA's were chosen from among
327 SMSA's other than New York and Chicago on criteria set out in
the note.2 9 Our sample area contains fifty-five percent of the metro-
politan population of the United States in 1970.
For the two hypothetical metropolitan areas in the text, the clustering indices are:
area: A: .4(.50 - .25)2 + .1(.5 - 0)2 + .5(.5 - .8)2 = .095
area B: .385(.50 - .221)2 + .115(.50 - .13)2 + .5(5 8)2 = .0907
23. In Table I we multiply each actual clustering index by 10,000 to avoid decimals.
24. The 1970 index uses 1969 income.
25. The correlation between 1959 rankings and the 1969 rankings is .71.
26. It is interesting to note that two out of the four SMSA's which showed a decline
in concentration of the poor during the decade were in Pennsyhania. This state has
consistently restricted local zoning powers more stringently than most other states.
Moreover, during the 1960's Pennsylvania courts struck down a number of exclusionary
land-use practices, including bans on multi-family dwellings and large lot zoning. See,
e.g., Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsch Appeal, 437 Pa.
237, 273 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 237, 273 A.2d 595 (1970).
27. One might note that New York, which is the origin of much of the publicity
on "exclusionary zoning," and is one of the few areas where detailed data on actual
zoning policies have been collected, ranked twelfth in the amount of clustering in
1959 and eleventh in 1969.
28. The federal government defines a standard metropolitan statistical area as an
integrated economic and social unit with a large population nucleus. More specifically.
"each standard metropolitan statistical area must contain at least one city of at
least 50,000 inhabitants .. . . The standard metropolitan statistical area will then in-
clude the county of such a central city, and adjacent counties that are found to be
metropolitan in character and economically and socially integrated with the county of
the central city. In New England the requirement with regard to a central city as a
nucleus still holds, but the units comprising the area are the towns rather than counties."
U.S. BuRxAu OF THE CENSUS, STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS 1967, at Vii-Iiii
(1967). The New York Standard Consolidated Area consists of the New York SMSA, Newark
SMSA, Jersey City SMSA, Paterson-Clifton-Passaic SMSA, Middlesex County and Som-
erset County. The Chicago Standard Consolidated Area consists of the Chicago SMSA and
the Gary-Hammond-East Chicago SMSA. We use 1960 definitions of each SMSA.
29. (1) The SMSA was among the fifty largest SMSA's as of July 1, 1968;
(2) the SMSA has one city of at least 150,000 population in both 1960 and
1970; this excluded San Berardino-Riverside-Ontario and ,bany-Schenc-
tady-Troy;
(3) the Washington, D.C. SMSA is omitted because the District of Columbia
does not receive funds from a state government;
(4) Newark and Paterson-Clifton-Passaic are omitted because they are part of
the New York Standard Consolidated Area;
(5) Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove is 'not counted separately but is included
in the Los Angeles SMSA;
(6) the SMSA (a) has at least fifteen "places" of over 2,500 population (Census
data for our variables do not exist for smaller "places') or (b) had nine
or more "places" in 1960, with the suburban "places" having at least half
495
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Explanatory Variable-Fiscal Incentives (Xi, X 2 , X3, X4)
We surmise that individuals and local governments are concerned
with the fiscal implications of having poor families to the extent that
(1) the local property tax absorbs a large proportion of the local citi-
zens' income, (2) the local property tax is an important source of local
revenues, (3) the local government finances a large fraction of local
expenditures, and (4) the allocation of state funds among communities
ignores the number of poor families in the community. These four
factors taken together measure the "strength" of the fiscal incentive
for imposing land use controls. We label them X1, X2 , X3 , X4 and
define them more precisely as follows:
X-property tax burden: As an index of the importance of the
local property tax, for each of the thirty metropolitan areas, we meas-
ure the local property tax as a proportion of personal income in the
1950's and in the 1960's;30 in the 1950's this ranged from 1.7 percent
in Birmingham to 5.4 percent in Boston, and in the 1960's from 1.8
percent in Birmingham to 6.1 percent in Boston.3'
X 2-municipal property tax dependence: This measures the per-
centage of total local government revenues in the entire metropolitan
area that accrue from the local property tax. This ranged in the 1950's
from 30.5 percent in Birmingham to 69.8 percent in Providence, and
in the 1960's from 26.6 percent in Birmingham to 65.8 percent in
Providence.
X 3-local school burden: On the expenditure side, we examined only
education, because it represents the largest single item in the budget
of local governments and because it responds more to changes in local
population than many other items in the local budget. As a measure
of the relative burden on local taxpayers, we used the proportion of
expenditures on local schools that is financed by the local property tax.
In 1957 this ranged from 18.8 percent in Birmingham to 87.7 percent
the suburban population. (We denote as "suburbs" all places within a
SMSA which are not considered by the Census Bureau to be "central
cities.") We wish to exclude SMSA's with only a few suburbs unless these
few suburbs contain a majority of the population living outside the cen-
tral city. Thus Akron, Columbus, and Sacramento were included although
they contain less than fifteen suburban "places," but the following were
excluded: Houston, Phoenix, New Orleans, Indianapolis, Portland (Orcon),
Tampa, St. Petersburg, Rochester, San Antonio, Hartford, Louisville, Bridge.
port, Memphis, New Haven, and Toledo.
30. The proportion for the 1950's was that found in 1957. The proportion for the
1960's was the average of that in 1962 and 1967. The source of this data Is the Census
of Governments, which was published, during these decades, only in the above years.
31. We do not use the ratio of the property tax to property values because we
consider income a superior measure of people's ability to pay.
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in Boston, and in 1967 this ranged from 16.1 percent in Birmingham
to 81.6 percent in Boston.
X 4-educational equalization formula: States allocate educational
funds by formulas which, at one extreme, ignore differences in the
wealth of local communities and, at the other extreme, enable poor
school districts to spend as much as wealthy ones. Because of the ab-
sence of an effective objective indicator of educational equalization, we
examined the educational aid formulas contained in past and present
state statutes and the commentary on many of them contained in the
works in this field,32 and from this information we created a series
of ratings of effectiveness of equalization for each state for each year,
from 1950 to 1959, and from 1960 to 1969. Ratings from one to ten
were assigned, one for a strict flat grant system or the equivalent, ten
for a plan in which all aid was equalizing. Theoretically, a rating be-
low one could be achieved, since some aid has been given out in direct
proportion to wealth, but no state achieved either this dubious dis-
tinction or a rating above nine. For those seven metropolitan areas
covering two states,33 we computed an equalization rating as the rat-
ing for each state weighted by the proportion of metropolitan popu-
lation in each state.
We considered that a state aid formula was more equalizing to the
extent that:
(1) A larger proportion of the aid was equalizing aid, rather than
flat g-rant aid, in actual effect.
(2) There were no (or low) floors and no (or high) ceilings on
equalizing aid.
(3) There was "negative" aid for especially wealthy districts (found
only in Utah).
(4) The local share was a large proportion of total local costs.
(Where the local share was particularly low, as in Washington,
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, even though all aid may have
been nominally equalizing, some was effectively flat grant,
since all districts received some aid.)
(5) The state provided no increase in aid to those districts em-
ploying better qualified teachers.
(6) The foundation level approached the level of actual costs.
32. J. BuIRHEAD, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, ECONO.MICS AND PoLIcs (1964); J. Coo.S,
AV. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE NVEALTI AND PUBLIC EDucxAroN (1970); R. Gwtsrr,
MODERN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (1969).
33. Chicago, Cincinnati, Kansas City, New York, Philadelphia, Providence. and
St. Louis.
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(7) The state matched local effort above the foundation level on
an equalizing basis.
(8) The state did not match local effort above the foundation level
on a strictly matching basis.
(9) There was special aid for districts with high proportions of
children from low income or AFDC families.
(10) Local taxes were levied or redistributed by a larger unit of
government, such as the county.
(11) There was special aid for high tax districts.
(12) Actual rather than theoretical costs were used to determine
the foundation level.
(13) Aid was not increased for consolidated school districts.
In the 1950's the most equalizing state was Pennsylvania and the
least equalizing was Washington; in the 1960's the most equalizing
state was Wisconsin and the least equalizing was Ohio.
Note that, if the fiscal motive is important, one would expect this
variable to vary inversely with clustering. The other fiscal variables,
by contrast, would be expected to vary directly with clustering.
Explanatory Variable-"race" (X5)
We conjectured that racial discrimination motivates government pol-
icy and also affects covenanting and other behavior on the private real
estate market. Thus, we calculated the proportion of the metropolitan
population in 1960 or 1970 that was either Black or "Spanish Heri-
tage"34 and predicted that the greater the proportion of these two
minority groups in the population, the greater would be income group
clustering. In 1960 this proportion ranged from 1.95 percent in the
Minneapolis SMSA to 34.6 percent in the Birmingham SMSA, and in
1970 it ranged from 2.7 percent in the Minneapolis SMSA to 38.6 per-
cent in the Miami SMSA.
Explanatory Variable-housing availability (Xo)
We include a low-cost housing "availability" variable, lagged by
nine years. We do this for two reasons. First, it helps us measure (and
hold constant) the spatial distribution of poor people one decade before
34. We followed the Census Bureau definition as to Spanish Hcritage. In 1970 this
meant "persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname" in New Mexico, Colorado,
Arizona, California, and Texas; "persons of Puerto Rican birth or parentage" In New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut; and "persons of Spanish language" in all other
states. In 1960, this meant "persons of Spanish surname" in New Mexico, Colorado,
Arizona, California, and Texas and "persons of Puerto Rican birth or parentage" In
all other states.
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the year in question, and thus to account for the multitude of histori-
cal factors peculiar to each metropolitan area. Second, to the extent
that, for one reason or another, a community had low-cost housing
occupied by families of above median income a decade before our
clustering observations, this variable measures the "built-in" ability of
the community to increase its proportion of poor families through
remodelling, the filtering process, or other forms of "down-grading."
This variable is computed in a fashion closely related to that used
to compute clustering. Consider the analysis of housing availability
before 1960. We deflate each 1959 SMISA median income by the change
in the consumer price index for housing in the metropolitan area dur-
ing the 1950's.3 5 For each locality in the metropolitan area, we then
compute the percentage of units which in 1950 could be afforded by
poor families living in the SMSA in 1959. We assume that these dwell-
ings include (a) rental units renting for twenty percent or less of the
deflated 1959 SMSA median income and (b) owner-occupied units for
sale at no more than two times the deflated 1959 SMSA median annual
income. The weighted variance in the percentage among tie different
localities within the SMSA is then computed and serves as our housing
availability variable in the 1960 analysis. An analogous procedure is
followed for the 1970 analysis.
Explanatory variable-zoning fragmentation (X7)
There is substantial variation in the "balkanization" of land-use
control powers in metropolitan regions. The number of zoning authori-
ties per million persons ranged in 1957 from 3.7 in the Baltimore
metropolitan area to 132.1 in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area; in
1967 the number ranged from eight in the Sacramento area to 128.2
in the Pittsburgh area. Under prevailing law each separate authority
can act autonomously.*We conjecture that the degree of fragmentation
of land-use control power should affect the nature of the decisions that
are made. The existence of large numbers of small districts may en-
courage each district to look after its own interests without considering
regional impact. The smaller the unit, the more likely that voters will
reflect relatively uniform values and interests. All other things being
equal, the greater the number of zoning authorities in a metropolitan
area, the more clustering should occur.
35. For those eleven SMSA's for which the consumer price index for housing is not
published, we use the average housing price index for other SMSA's in the state or,
in the 4 cases for which there is no index for any SMSA in the state, we use the na-
tional housing price index. Price indices are from U.S. ButaRAu OF L.,oit STxrwrcs,
HANDBOR OF LABOR STAIs'TICS 1971 Table 118 (1972).
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The values for our seven explanatory variables are set out in the
Appendix.36
III. Results
The extent of correlation between one variable and a set of "ex-
planatory variables" may range between zero and -one hundred percent.
In the social sciences correlations are rarely as high as in the natural
sciences. For example, the "Coleman Report" on factors influencing
student achievement was able to "explain" only ab6ut twenty percent
of the variation of scores on a verbal test in a sample of 570,000 school
pupils in the U.S.3
The seven variables in our study together "explain" fifty-five per-
cent of the variation in the dispersion of poor families in our thirty
metropolitan areas.38
The most significant explanatory variables are the "availability" of
housing (Xo), the racial composition of the metropolitan population
(X5), and the number of zoning authorities per million persons (X7).
These three variables all influence clustering in the direction indicated
by our conjectures. Our results indicate that the clustering index is
larger, all other things equal, (1) the greater the number of zoning
authorities, (2) the greater the proportion of racial minorities, and (3)
the more concentrated was the housing stock a decade earlier. The
proportion of the local school budgets that is financed locally (Xa) is
only weakly related to the degree of clustering.
By contrast, the other three fiscal variables-local property tax as
percentage of personal income (X1), local property tax as a percentage
of local revenues (X2) and state educational equalization formula (X4)
-have no statistically significant impact on clustering after the impact
of the other variables has been taken into account. (In addition to be-
ing statistically insignificant, the coefficient of X 4 is positive rather
36. We did not include a variable for the dispersion of jobs for two reasons, one
practical and one theoretical. We did not have good data on the physical dispersion
of jobs that a poor person might reasonably be expected to fill. As for theory: If all
jobs were located in one area and if poor people had equal access to all residential
land within the metropolitan area, then we would expect poor people to live In a
circle whose center would be the place of employment; if there are several concentra-
tions of jobs for the poor, we would expect each to have poor people living In a
circle about it, and our clustering index cannot distinguish these two alternative patterns.
37. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (COLEMAN REPORT) (1966).
38. The "F ratio" is 9.16, which indicates that the probability that our results could
occur by chance is less than one percent.
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than, as conjectured, negative and the coefficient of X2 is negative
rather than, as conjectured, positive.)
These results are derived through the technique of least squares re-
gression and are well summarized in a regression equation:30
Y = .27X 1 - .54X2 + .82X 3 +2.83X 4 + 2.93Xa + .14Xo + .72Xr
(.35) (--.61) (1.80) (.62) (3.76) (4.01) (3.09)
The coefficient for each explanatory variable indicates its impact
on the dependent variable-the clustering index-when all other ex-
planatory variables are held constant. Below each coefficient we indi-
cate in parentheses the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error;
the larger the absolute value of this ratio (the T-ratio) the more con-
fidence one has that the coefficient is significant, i.e., that the variable
in question has an influence on clustering.40
IV. Legal and Policy Implications: Preliminary Speculations
A-The Fiscal Motive
The first, and perhaps clearest, implication of the study for policy-
making is negative; we find no substantial relationship between resi-
dential patterns and fiscal incentives for imposition of controls. There
is some evidence that a reduction in the locally funded share of school
expenditures might have some slight impact on residential patterns,
39. Least squares regression is a standard statistical technique for finding the equation
which best predicts the dependent variable-in our case, the clustering index: of poor
families-from the observed values of a group of explanatory variables. The best pre.
dictive equation is the one that minimizes the sum of the squared deviations between
the predicted values of the dependent variable and the observed values of the dependent
variable. Since we are interested in the coefficients of the explanatory variables, we do
not report the constant term in our regression equations.
The regression in the text uses the data for both 1960 and 1970. The separate re-
gressions for 1960 and 1970 are consistent with this regression and are available upon
request. Some readers of an earlier draft thought that peculiarities of southern states
might have led to misleading results on a national basis. However, we get similar
results when we omit the five southern metropolitan areas (Miami, Birmingham, Atlanta,
Dallas, and Fort Worth). For the twenty-five non-southern metropolitan areas the
combined regression is:
Y = .36X, + .15X 2 + .76X, - .95X, + 3.08X3 + .14X + .77XT(.43) (.16) (1.60) (-.21) (3.20) (3.97) (3.39)
R2 _ .63
40. We judge significance by the size of the T.ratio. Economists tend to consider
a variable as insignificant if its T-ratio is less than 2.0. Jencks, in his critique of the
Coleman Report data on public Schools, considered a variable as insignificant if its
T-ratio was less than 1.0. Jencks, The Colenan Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in
ON EQUALrrY OF EDUCAMONAL OPPORTUNrry 112 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
The size of the coefficient on each explanatory variable depends on the scale on which
it is measured; for example, the coefticient for variable X, would be ten times larger
if it were measured as the number of zoning authorities per 100,000 persons.
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but the statistical relationship is quite weak. And the data suggest that
changes in the formulas governing state aid to education would have
a negligible effect on clustering.
This may mean either that public controls and restrictive covenants
are not in fact motivated by fiscal considerations or that, however
motivated, controls and covenants have little effect on clustering. In
either event, however, our results raise tentative doubts that decisions
like Serrano and Rodriguez, if upheld, would significantly affect clus-
tering. It is premature to say what remedies will be framed in the
school financing cases. One remedy would be complete state financing
of education. Our sample does not include any system of pure state
finance of education.4 1 Therefore, it can offer no prediction of what
might happen under a radical change of this type.
It is more likely, however, that the school financing cases will pre-
cipitate less drastic changes. State aid formulas might be altered so
that only a small change is made in the share of school expenditures
coming from the local property tax. Our statistical evidence suggests
that this approach would not have much impact on clustering.42 Thus
even if every state adopted a system of local finance approximating
that of Alabama, whose system seems to present the weakest fiscal
motive, we would anticipate no significant change in residential pat-
terns.
B-Metropolitan Fragmentation
The strong relationship between clustering and the number of inde-
pendent zoning bodies in a metropolitan region indicates that the less
the public power to control land use is fragmented in a metropolitan
region, the less clustering one finds. This finding is quite important.
Not only does it lend credence to several theories about local exclusion-
ary behavior; it also provides the clearest evidence we could secure
that public controls do, in fact, materially influence the degree of
clustering.
41. Hawaii would fit this criterion, but it also has state-wide zoning, so that It does
not offer an opportunity to study the effect of educational finance on decentralized
land-use decision-making.
42. An extensive series of interviews with planning officials in the New laven
SMSA indicates that finances have little impact on their zoning decisions. Fear of
change in the style of the town (sometimes related to fears of change in the racial
composition of the population) is the dominant factor for these officials. R. Colloff,
Serrano and the Suburbs: The Impact of Education Finance Return on Suburban
Zoning Practices (Senior Studies Paper, Yale Law School, May 1972). A recent study
of two Boston suburbs concludes that racial and class discrimination, not tile fiscal
burden, led to the refusal to allow small public housing projects. ENGLER, SuslIZED
HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS: LEGISLATION OR LITIGATION? (Joint Center for Urban Studies
of M.I.T. and Harvard U., Abstract No. 4, 1971.)
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On this latter point, it might be argued that "balkanization" makes
residents more aware of the fiscal advantages of excluding the poor
and makes it easier for substantial private covenant schemes to pre-
serve the fiscal character of political subdivisions. Thus, conceivably,
balkanization increases clustering not through its effect on the deci-
sions of public officials but through encouraging private covenants. But
this thesis assumes that fiscal incentives are an important motivation for
private covenanting behavior, and-as noted above-our results show at
most a marginal role for the fiscal motive.
Heavy reliance on the fiscal motive, by contrast, is unnecessary to
explain how a more fragmented system of land-use control adminis-
tration would lead to more exclusionary public policies. In any com-
munity, there may be interest groups concerned to preserve the status
quo-whether this be fiscal, racial, economic class, or environmental.
The larger and more inclusive the jurisdiction, the less likely it is that
these interest groups will be able to dominate decision-making. Fur-
ther, communities may exclude the poor not to attain some absolute
quality of life in the community but only to give the community a
relative advantage, compared with neighboring communities, as to
fiscal structure, aesthetic environment, snob appeal, and the like. That
is, exclusion may be a competitive phenomenon, and competition is
more likely where there is a multiplicity of competing jurisdictions
than where only a few large political subdivisions compose the metro-
politan area. In the latter case, a subdivision will know clearly that its
practices will be detected by its few "rivals" and that retaliation by them
will be virtually certain and usually effective. Moreover, the larger the
jurisdiction, the more likely it is that policies must actually be made
through public and formal procedures, and the less likely that ethically
or legally questionable motives and arguments would affect decision-
making. Finally, it is possible that land-use control decision-making is
more professionalized in larger entities, reducing the impact on actual
decisions of political passions and popular prejudices.
The findings on fragmentation suggest that efforts to dismantle con-
trols, and thereby "perfect" the market, and efforts to impose greater
regional and state control over local decision-making, may both reduce
income group clustering.
C-Race
When we turn to the racial data, the task of evaluating our findings
becomes more complex. The data show that there is significantly more
clustering in metropolitan areas with large minority group populations,
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and thus that clustering is in some sense a racial as well as a class phe-
nomena. What our data cannot determine, however, is whether racial
considerations alter the locational preferences of buyers, the selling
and leasing decisions of landowners, the incidence of covenants restrict-
ing land use, the incidence of public controls or some mix of all of
these.
Because the incidence of poverty is greater among minority fami-
lies,43 the high-minority SMSA's are areas where a relatively larger per-
centage of the poor are from minority groups. The greater degree of
clustering in these areas could, then, be explained by at least four dis-
tinct hypotheses:
(i) Poor Blacks and "Spanish Heritage" groups have a higher pro-
pensity to cluster voluntarily than do the poor of other origins.
(ii) Racial discrimination by individual sellers and lessors inevita-
bly increases income group clustering in high-minority SMSA's.
(iii) Covenants restricting land use, while operating to keep out all
lower income groups, are motivated by fears and dislike of the
minority group poor.
(iv) Public land-use controls, while operating to keep out all lower
income groups, are motivated by fears and dislike of the mi-
nority group poor.
The first hypothesis is not wholly implausible. Blacks, Chicanos, and
Puerto Ricans are generally among the most recent immigrants to ur-
ban areas. They may, accordingly, have greater cultural and economic
needs for association with others like themselves than those who are
further from rural or foreign origins. Or, there may be historical and
ethnic factors which cause them to value center city neighborhoods
and communities more highly than the white poor.44
While the "voluntary clustering" hypothesis is speculative, there is
evidence that the private real estate market does discriminate against
racial minority groups.45 To the extent that private discrimination
keeps the minorities-and thus a large percentage of the total poor in
43. Using the Social Security Administration's poverty level of about $770 per person
per year, one finds, for example, that in 1964 one-tenth of the whites in metropolitan
areas were poor, as compared to about one-third of the non-whites. Non-whites comprised
one-third of the metropolitan poor in 1964. Orshansky, The Poor in City and Suburb,
1964, 29 SOCUL SEcurrY BuLL. 25 (1966).
44. We know little of the residential preferences of different racial groups. A recent
study indicates that a significantly larger fraction of Blacks than whites moved within
a metropolitan area between 1966 and 1969, but many of the Blacks were forced to
move. McAllister, Kaiser & Butler, Residential Mobility of Blacks and Whites: A Na.
tional Longitudinal Survey, 77 Am. J. SocioLoGY 445-56 (1971).
45. DOUGLAS Comm. REPORT, supra note 1, at 78-80.
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the high minority SMSA-out of the suburbs, it would lead to the
higher degree of clustering observed there.
Finally, our findings may mean that clustering is caused by racially
motivated public controls or restrictive covenants which erect barriers
to the poor generally: that is, suburbanites may perceive that economic
integration means racial integration. No town can lawfully adopt gen-
eral policies that explicitly exclude racial minorities, and covenants
phrased in racial terms are unenforceable in the courts. Moreover, it is
extremely difficult to operate public land-use controls on a selective
case-by-case basis in a way that will effectively keep out minority group
members but not other persons of lower income: it would be difficult
to identify in advance which units, areas, or developments would be
occupied by Blacks. Thus a class policy may be the only effective way
to achieve racial goals.
Since our data are consistent with all four rival hypotheses, further
research will be needed to clarify the policy and legal significance of
our preliminary findings. A further study we contemplate, when the
necessary data are available, will compare the clustering of poor whites
with the clustering of poor non-whites. If we find that poor whites are
not significantly less clustered than poor non-whites, we will have
strong evidence to dispute the first two hypotheses and to support
a conclusion that it is racially motivated governmental policies or re-
strictive covenants which prevent poor minority families from moving
to the suburbs. This is so because if the overall clustering of the poor
resulted from racial differences in locational preferences, or from racial
discrimination by sellers and lessors acting individually, there would
be no reason to find a correlation between the proportion of minority
group members in the population and the degree of clustering among
whites.
Even if the first two hypotheses were refuted, however, it would still
be necessary to fashion tests to distinguish between the last two. Earlier
we noted that our data suggest that public controls do have an impact
on income group clustering and that these controls are not motivated
significantly by fiscal considerations. It is possible that the racial factor
discussed in this subsection affects the incidence only of private cove-
nants restricting land use, and that public controls are motivated by
neither fiscal nor racial considerations but are rather motivated by
such "neutral" concerns as health, safety, aesthetics, and the like. But
this seems to us unlikely: public controls and private covenants have
nearly identical effects and are commonly viewed as interchangeable;
that the two devices are animated by totally distinct motives is implausi-
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ble. Thus, if the presence of racial minorities were correlated with
clustering among whites, we would be inclined to conclude that both
public controls and private covenants are racially motivated to a sub-
stantial degree in the United States.
V. Conclusion
Challenges to suburban land-use controls have made a number of
factual assumptions. We found some qualified support for two of those
made by the Equal Protection challenges: that public controls do affect
the degree of income group clustering, and that these controls may, to
an extent, be racially motivated.
While we stress the importance of further empirical research in this
area, such research cannot itself resolve the complex questions raised
by the challenges. Indeed, the interpretation of empirical findings will
often depend on the resolution of normative issues. For instance, fur-
ther research may show that public controls aggravate clustering but
that residential patterns are largely established by differential buyer
preferences and purchasing power. To determine how much impact
on clustering public controls must have before those controls become
"troublesome" 
-or "undesirable" is a normative question. Similarly,
further research may show that racial considerations and permissible
considerations (of health, aesthetics, and safety) both animate the im-
position of controls in most cases. The question of when a contribut-
ing factor becomes a "primary" or an "important" motive is again
normative.
The debate on "exclusion" of the poor and of minorities is now too
often a matter of flat empirical assertion and of colorful, but imprecise,
rhetoric. We need rather a careful dialogue between empirical re-
searchers and those prepared to sort out the subtle, and often conflict-
ing, normative issues at stake.
APPENDIX
Sources for Table II:
Xj: 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 3, No. 6, Table 3; 1962 CENSUS or
GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 5, Table 12; 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 5,
Table 12; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS INCOME DATA (May 1970);
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 1; STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1963) Table 433.
X 2 : 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 3, No. 6, Table 3; 1962 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 5, Table 12; 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 5,
Table 12.
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X3: 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 3, No. 1, Table 7; 1967 CENsus OF
GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 4, No. 1, Table 8; various state sources for those
states with "dependent" school districts.
X4 : Estimated from evaluation of state statutes and J. CooNs, W. CLUNE &
S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970); R.
GARVUE, MODERN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (1969); J. BURKHEAD, PUBLIC
SCHOOL FINANCE, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS (1964).
XZ: U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING (1960) Table p-1; U.S. CEN-
SUS OF POPULATION (1970) Table PC(1)-C1, Tables 81, 91, & 96 for per-
tinent states.
X0 : Computed from U.S. CENSUS OF HOUSING (1950) Tables 21 & 24 for
pertinent states; U.S. CENSUS OF HOUSING (1960) Tables 16, 17, 21, 2-1,
& 26 for pertinent states.
X 7: 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, Vol. 1, No. 2, Table 3; 1960 CENSuS OF
PoPuLATION, Vol. 1, Table 5; 1962 CENSUS OF GovERNM ENrs, Vol. 1,
Table 15; 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENIrs, Vol. 1, Table 19; 1970 CL'N-
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